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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellant Armstrong Surgical Center, Inc. (the "Surgical 
Center") contends that Armstrong County Memorial 
Hospital and nineteen of its staff physicians (the"Hospital 
Defendants") conspired to prevent it from establishing an 
ambulatory surgery center, thereby restraining and 
monopolizing trade in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act. The District Court dismissed the complaint 
after concluding that the alleged conduct was immune from 
antitrust scrutiny. We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
We review the District Court's order dismissing the 
Surgical Center's complaint de novo. See Jeremy H. v. 
Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 1996). 
In reviewing that order, we employ the same standard the 
District Court used, accepting as true all factual allegations 
contained in the complaint and all reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn therefrom. See Schuylkill Energy 
Resources, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. , 113 F.3d 
405, 411 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 435 (1997). 
 
II. 
 
The Surgical Center has plans to build a free-standing 
ambulatory surgery center in the city of Kittanning, 
Armstrong County, Pennsylvania. If constructed, that 
facility would provide outpatient surgical services, including 
both general surgery and various specialities. Currently, the 
Hospital is the only facility with operating rooms in 
Armstrong County, and the nineteen staff physician 
defendants perform the vast majority of surgeries in the 
county. Only one independent ambulatory surgery center 
operates in the four counties that border Armstrong 
County, and this center is approximately fifty miles from 
the Surgical Center's proposed site. If constructed, the 
Surgical Center's facility would compete directly with the 
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Hospital and its staff physicians in the outpatient surgery 
market. Moreover, the Surgical Center alleges that it would 
offer outpatient surgical services at prices significantly 
lower than the Hospital's. 
 
Under the Pennsylvania Health Care Facilities Act, 
anyone proposing to establish a new health care facility 
must first obtain a Certificate of Need ("CON") from 
Pennsylvania's Department of Health. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 
35, S 448.701(a)(2). The Act seeks to ensure"the orderly 
and economical distribution of health care resources to 
prevent needless duplication of services." Id. at S 448.102. 
The Department individually reviews CON applications in 
an extensive proceeding consisting of an investigation, an 
evaluation of submitted materials, and a public hearing. 
During this review, the Department considers various 
health planning issues, including the adequacy of existing 
health care providers and the need for additional services 
or facilities. See id. S 448.707. Interested parties, including 
health care providers who supply similar services in the 
area, may petition for public meetings or hearings and 
submit information to the Department on any CON 
application. See id. SS 448.103, 448.704(b). 
 
In March of 1991, the Surgical Center filed an application 
for a CON with the Department as required. Thereafter, 
according to the Surgical Center's complaint, the Hospital 
defendants, including fourteen physicians who originally 
supported the Surgical Center's project, entered into a 
conspiracy to subvert establishment of the new facility. The 
alleged conspiracy involved: (1) the physicians announcing 
that they would boycott the proposed outpatient center and 
(2) the Hospital defendants submitting false and misleading 
information to the Department. Specifically, the Surgical 
Center alleges that the Hospital defendants informed the 
Department that its nineteen physicians would not use the 
Surgical Center facility in the hope that this information 
would convince the Department that the proposed facility 
could not meet the statutory requirements for a CON. In 
addition, the Surgical Center claims that the Hospital 
defendants sought to mislead the Department into believing 
that the Hospital intended to open its own outpatient 
center, which was then under construction, and that this 
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facility would satisfy all of Armstrong County's outpatient 
surgery needs. The Hospital's partially constructed facility 
was designed to provide alternative space for outpatient 
surgeries then conducted in three of the Hospital's six 
mixed-use operating rooms. According to the Surgical 
Center, however, the Hospital defendants knew that the 
construction of the Hospital's facility had been stopped with 
only the shell of the building completed and that the 
Hospital had made no commitment to resume construction. 
Despite this knowledge, it is alleged that the Hospital 
defendants falsely represented to the Department that its 
new center was either in use or very near completion. 
 
The Department denied the Surgical Center's CON 
application. The Surgical Center appealed that decision to 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State Health Facility 
Hearing Board, which conducted its own hearing and 
received additional evidence.1 The Board affirmed the 
Department's decision after finding that (1) the Surgical 
Center's facility would result in needless duplication of 
existing facilities and health care services, and (2) the 
Surgical Center would not be economically viable because 
the nineteen Hospital surgeons who performed ninety 
percent of Armstrong County's surgeries would not use the 
Surgical Center facility. According to the Board,"the most 
damaging evidence [against the Surgical Center's 
application] is that the number of physicians who might 
have been expected to support the facility decreased 
significantly after the Applicant had submitted its 
projections." The Surgical Center appealed the Board's 
decision to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 
which affirmed the Board's decision. 
 
The Surgical Center filed this antitrust action seeking 
treble damages for, inter alia, denial of the CON, lost value 
of the CON and the proposed outpatient center, and lost 
profits. It contends that the Hospital defendants' conspiracy 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Act of Feb. 23, 1996, P.L. 27, 1996 Pa. Laws 10, S 9(a) (repealing 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, SS 448.501-448.507), has since eliminated the 
Health Facility Hearing Board and transferred its review functions to the 
Health Care Policy Board. This change does not affect our review of the 
Surgical Center's appeal. 
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caused the Department to deny its CON application. The 
District Court dismissed the Surgical Center's suit for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding that the Hospital 
defendants' conduct was immune from antitrust scrutiny. 
 
III. 
 
We begin by considering the Surgical Center's claim that 
the Hospital defendants conspired to boycott its outpatient 
center, thereby violating sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act. To state a claim under section 1, a plaintiff must allege 
"a contract, combination or conspiracy; a restraint of trade; 
and an effect on interstate commerce." Fuentes v. South 
Hills Cardiology, 946 F.2d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 1991). Section 
2 of the Sherman Act prohibits both monopolies and 
attempts to monopolize. See 15 U.S.C. S 2. A claim under 
section 2 must allege "(1) that the defendant has engaged in 
predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific 
intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of 
achieving monopoly power." Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. 
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456, 113 S. Ct. 884, 890-91 
(1993); see also Schuylkill Energy Resources, 113 F.3d at 
413. 
 
"A classic boycott involves concerted action with a 
purpose either to exclude a person or group from the 
market, or to accomplish some other anticompetitive object, 
or both." Fuentes, 946 F.2d at 202 (internal quotes 
omitted); see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 
438 U.S. 531, 541, 98 S. Ct. 2923, 2929-30 (1978). Such 
commercially motivated group boycotts, or concerted 
refusals to deal, generally are considered illegal per se 
under section 1. See F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 431-32, 110 S. Ct. 768, 779-80 
(1990); Weiss v. York Hospital, 745 F.2d 786, 818 (3d Cir. 
1984). When a boycott's aim is to monopolize trade, it 
might also violate section 2. See Retina Associates v. 
Southern Baptist Hosp. of Fla., Inc., 105 F.3d 1376, 1384 
(11th Cir. 1997). 
 
The Hospital defendants do not deny that the complaint 
alleges a threat of a boycott that might under other 
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circumstances constitute an antitrust violation. They insist, 
however, that the complaint alleges facts establishing that 
they are immune from antitrust liability. Specifically, they 
contend that their activities are insulated from antitrust 
scrutiny because their allegedly wrongful conduct occurred 
in the context of supplying information to the Pennsylvania 
Department of Health during the Surgical Center's CON 
application process and because the injuries alleged 
resulted solely from the Department's denial of the CON. 
 
In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), an agricultural 
producer challenged a marketing program adopted by 
California's Director of Agriculture as invalid under the 
Sherman Act. The program served to restrict competition 
among growers and maintain prices in commodity 
distribution. "Relying on principles of federalism and state 
sovereignty, [the Supreme Court] held that the Sherman 
Act did not apply to anticompetitive restraints imposed by 
the States `as an act of government.' " City of Columbia v. 
Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991). 
 
In Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and United Mine Workers 
v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), the Supreme Court 
held that antitrust liability cannot be predicated solely on 
petitioning to secure government action even where those 
efforts are intended to eliminate competition. As the Court 
explained in Noerr, "[t]he right of the people to inform their 
representatives in government of their desires with respect 
to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot properly be 
made to depend on their interest in doing so." Noerr, 365 
U.S. at 139. 
 
The Parker doctrine and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine 
have been interpreted as complementing each other to 
protect the two related but distinct principles upon which 
they are founded. As the Supreme Court has more recently 
observed: 
 
       Parker and Noerr are complementary expressions of the 
       principle that the antitrust laws regulate business, not 
       politics; the former decision protects the States' acts of 
       governing, and the latter the citizens' participation in 
       government. 
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Omni, 499 U.S. at 383. 
 
As the Surgical Center emphasizes, however, the 
immunity afforded to a private party under Noerr is not 
unlimited. Where the challenged private conduct is only 
"sham" petitioning -- i.e., where it "is not genuinely aimed 
at procuring favorable government action as opposed to a 
valid effort to influence government action"-- Noerr 
immunity is not available. Professional Real Estate 
Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures, Inc. 508 U.S. 49 (1993) 
("PRE"). In essence, sham petitioning entails "the use of the 
governmental process -- as opposed to the outcome of that 
process -- as an anticompetitive weapon." PRE, 508 U.S. at 
61 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the sham petitioning 
exception does not apply in a case like the one before us 
where the plaintiff has not alleged that the petitioning 
conduct was for any purpose other than obtaining favorable 
government action.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Plaintiff 's allegations that both the threatened boycott and the 
claimed 
misrepresentations were intended to secure denial of the CON 
distinguish the situation before us from cases like Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. 
v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119 (3d Cir. 1999), that deal with the "sham" 
exception to the Noerr doctrine. In Cheminor, the defendant, Ethyl, had 
petitioned the International Trade Commission and the Department of 
Commerce, alleging that Cheminor was dumping bulk ibuprofin on the 
U.S. market and seeking the imposition of extra duties to offset the 
alleged subsidies that enabled it to do so. Although Cheminor withdrew 
from the U.S. market prior to a final decision on Ethyl's petition, it 
alleged injuries resulting from the petition and brought an antitrust suit 
against Ethyl. In response to Ethyl's reliance on Noerr immunity, 
Cheminor asserted that the petition was a "sham" and Noerr immunity 
thus was unavailable. We analyzed and rejected Cheminor's argument 
under the teachings of PRE. 
 
PRE holds that Noerr immunity is lost when the petition is a "sham," 
i.e., "is not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action." 
PRE, 508 U.S. at 58. As we noted in Cheminor, PRE further holds that 
determining whether a petition is a sham requires a two-step process. 
First, the Court determines whether the petition is "objectively 
baseless;" 
if not, the petition is not a sham without regard to the subjective intent 
of the petitioner. Second, if the petition is objectively baseless (and 
only 
if it is objectively baseless), the Court is to look to the petitioner's 
"subjective motivation" and determine "whether the baseless [petition] 
conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships 
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It is also true that a private party can be held liable even 
for bona-fide petitioning conduct where that conduct has 
caused direct antitrust injury in the market place. F.T.C. v. 
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n., 493 U.S. 411 (1990). In 
Trial Lawyers, for example, the public defenders of the 
District of Columbia engaged in a concerted refusal to 
represent indigent defendants in order to pressure the 
District into raising the hourly rate paid. The Court held 
that the defendants could be held liable under the Sherman 
Act for injuries that resulted directly from the boycott, even 
though the boycott was intended to secure government 
action. 
 
The limitation on Noerr immunity recognized in Trial 
Lawyers is inapplicable, however, to a case where the sole 
antitrust injury is caused directly by the government action 
that the private defendant has helped to secure. Thus, even 
where the same petitioning conduct might give rise to 
antitrust liability for injury directly caused to a competitor 
in the marketplace, if relief is sought solely for injury as to 
which the state would enjoy immunity under Parker, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of a competitor through the use of governmental process -- as opposed 
to the outcome of that process -- as an anticompetition weapon." 508 
U.S. at 60-61 (emphasis in original) (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144, and 
Omni, 499 U.S. at 380). 
 
Cheminor holds that where the petitioning effort allegedly involves 
misrepresentations, the Court, at the first step, must "determine whether 
[the] petition was objectively baseless under[PRE] without regard to those 
facts that the [plaintiff] alleges [the petitioner] misrepresented." 
Cheminor, 
168 F.3d at 123 (emphasis in original). Such a determination is 
unnecessary here, however, because the plaintiff affirmatively alleges 
that defendants' purpose was to secure the outcome of the process -- 
denial of the CON. Thus, even if defendants' opposition to the CON were 
found to be objectively baseless (a conclusion that could not be reached 
on this record), defendants would pass the second, "subjective" test and 
the sham exception to Noerr immunity would be inapplicable here. 
 
While Cheminor focuses on the sham exception to Noerr immunity, it 
also rejects Cheminor's more general argument that "Noerr-Pennington 
immunity does not apply at all to petitions containing 
misrepresentations." Id. To that extent, it supports the conclusion 
reached below with respect to the misrepresentation claim. 
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private petitioner also enjoys immunity. As the Supreme 
Court explained in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian 
Head, Inc.: 
 
       Concerted efforts to restrain or monopolize trade by 
       petitioning government officials are protected from 
       antitrust liability under the doctrine established by 
       [Noerr; Pennington, and California Motor Transport Co. 
       v. Trucking Unlimited]. The scope of this protection 
       depends, however, on the source, context, and nature 
       of the anticompetitive restraint at issue. "[W]here a 
       restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of 
       valid governmental action, as opposed to private 
       action," those urging the governmental action enjoy 
       absolute immunity from antitrust liability for the 
       anticompetitive restraint. 
 
486 U.S. 492, 499 (1987) (citations omitted) (quoting Noerr, 
365 U.S. at 136). 
 
We applied this principle in Mass. School of Law at 
Andover, Inc. v. American Bar Assoc., 107 F.3d 1026 (1997) 
("MSL"). There, the plaintiff, an unaccredited law school, 
complained of injuries resulting from the fact that, without 
ABA accreditation, the school's graduates were refused 
admittance to most states' bar examinations. We identified 
the critical issue as "whether state or private conduct 
caused the injury MSL alleges it suffered." Id. at 1035. 
Looking to the source of the restraint-causing injury, we 
found that because "every state retains the final authority 
to set all the bar admission rules," any injury the plaintiff 
suffered "is the result of state action and thus immune." Id. 
at 1035-36. 
 
This reasoning was similarly applied in Sandy River 
Nursing Care v. Aetna Casualty, 985 F.2d 1138, 1147 (1st 
Cir. 1993), where the defendant insurers allegedly employed 
a boycott in an effort to force the legislature to enact 
legislation permitting rate increases. Because all the 
plaintiff 's claimed injuries were associated with increased 
rates charged by the defendants after the legislature 
removed the rate limits, the court concluded that 
"[plaintiff's injuries] must be viewed as a product of state 
action" and that the defendants were, accordingly, immune 
from liability. 
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Here, looking to the source of the complained of injuries, 
we find that all of the Surgical Center's alleged injuries 
arise solely from the denial of the CON: the denial of the 
ability to operate the proposed facility; the loss of the CON's 
value, the value of the facility, and the value of the 
operation's proceeds; the delay in securing the CON; and 
"other related losses." Each of the injuries the plaintiff 
claims is a direct result of the Department's decision to 
deny the plaintiff's application for a CON.3 
 
In sum, where, as here, all of the plaintiff 's alleged 
injuries result from state action, antitrust liability cannot 
be imposed on a private party who induced the state action 
by means of concerted anticompetitive activity. It follows 
that the complaint fails to state a boycott claim upon which 
relief can be granted. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136; Parker, 
317 U.S. at 352. 
 
IV. 
 
The Surgical Center's second claim is that the Hospital 
defendants, as a part of their conspiracy, misled the 
Department, the Board, and the Commonwealth Court into 
believing that the Hospital's partially constructed facility 
would soon open and meet the needs of the relevant market 
when the Hospital defendants knew that the facility would 
not be completed. The resulting injury, it is said, was the 
denial of the Surgical Center's application for a CON. The 
Center would have us deny antitrust immunity to the 
Hospital defendants on the grounds that they successfully 
opposed the issuance of a CON using information known to 
be false. 
 
Although the Supreme Court suggested in California 
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 
512-13 (1972), that petitioning activity involving knowingly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. While plaintiff also claims "increased costs, legal and otherwise, in 
pursuing Plaintiff's application for a CON," the referenced costs 
apparently relate to the appeal plaintiff prosecuted from the Board's 
decision. Plaintiff does not contend that it incurred costs at the Board 
level in excess of the cost it would have incurred had the threat of a 
boycott (or the alleged misrepresentations) not been made. 
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false information submitted to an adjudicative tribunal 
might not enjoy antitrust immunity, the Court has never so 
held. See PRE, 508 U.S. at 61 n.6 (suggesting that the 
issues of whether there is a misrepresentation exception to 
Noerr and, if so, the extent thereof, remain open). Moreover, 
since California Motor, the Supreme Court has decided a 
case that casts doubt on whether such an exception exists 
under any circumstances and dictates that, in the 
circumstances of this case, we honor the Hospital 
defendants' claim to immunity. 
 
In Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 
(1991), Columbia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. ("COA") 
controlled 95 percent of the billboard rental business in 
Columbia, South Carolina. According to respondent Omni 
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. ("Omni"), a newcomer to the 
market, COA and city officials conspired to restrain 
competition in the market through adoption of a zoning 
ordinance limiting the size, spacing, and location of 
billboards in the city. Omni filed suit against the city and 
COA alleging a violation of the Sherman Act. A jury found 
the existence of a conspiracy between the city and COA, 
and both were held liable for Omni's injuries despite their 
insistence that they were entitled to antitrust immunity 
under Parker and Noerr, respectively. 
 
The Court first concluded that Omni's alleged injury was 
the result of state action. South Carolina had authorized its 
municipalities to regulate land use and construction and, 
in doing so, had provided a "clear articulation of state 
policy to authorize anticompetitive conduct by the 
municipality in connection with its regulation." Omni, 499 
U.S. at 372 (quoting Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 
471 U.S. 34, 40 (1985)). As the Court explained: 
 
       The very purpose of zoning regulation is to displace 
       unfettered business freedom in a manner that regularly 
       has the effect of preventing normal acts of competition, 
       particularly on the part of new entrants. A municipal 
       ordinance restricting the size, location, and spacing of 
       billboards (surely a common form of zoning) necessarily 
       protects existing billboards against some competition 
       from newcomers. 
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Id. at 373 (footnote omitted). 
 
Having thus concluded that "the city's restriction of 
billboard construction was prima facie entitled to Parker 
immunity," id. at 374, the Court turned to the issue of 
whether the existence of a conspiracy between city officials 
and COA had stripped the city of that immunity. Itfirst 
noted the foundation of Parker immunity: 
 
       The rationale of Parker was that, in light of our 
       national commitment to federalism, the general 
       language of the Sherman Act should not be interpreted 
       to prohibit anticompetitive actions by the States in 
       their governmental capacities as sovereign regulators. 
 
Id. It then observed that if conspiracy was taken to mean 
"nothing more than an agreement to impose the regulation 
in question," the purpose of Parker immunity would be 
defeated because "it is both inevitable and desirable that 
public officials often agree to do what one or another group 
of private citizens urges upon them." Id. at 375. 
 
Because the jury had been instructed that a conspiracy 
was "an agreement . . . to accomplish an otherwise lawful 
result in an unlawful manner," id. at 376 n.5, the Court 
next considered whether Parker immunity is lost when it is 
shown that an agreement between the defendants involved 
governmental corruption, bribery, or other violations of 
state or federal law. It held that Parker immunity remains 
in such circumstances. The Court found "impractical" the 
contention that Parker immunity is forfeited by 
governmental corruption, "defined variously as 
`abandonment of public responsibilities to private interests,' 
. . . `corrupt or bad faith decisions,' . . . and `selfish or 
corrupt motives.' " Id. at 376. Such a rule would call upon 
antitrust courts to speculate as to whether state action 
purportedly taken in the public interest was the product of 
an honest judgment or desire for private gain. The Court 
stressed that Parker "was not meant to shift [judgments 
about the public interest] from elected officials to judges 
and juries." Id. at 377. 
 
With respect to the contention that Parker immunity 
should be forfeited at least where bribery or other illegal 
activity may have subverted the state decision making 
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process, the Court observed that this approach had "the 
virtue of practicality but the vice of being unrelated to" the 
purposes of the Sherman Act and Parker. Id. at 378. It 
chose to rely on sanctions other than the Sherman Act to 
discourage such behavior: 
 
       To use unlawful political influence as the test of 
       legality of state regulation undoubtedly vindicates (in a 
       rather blunt way) principles of good government. But 
       the statute we are construing is not directed to that 
       end. Congress has passed other laws aimed at 
       combating corruption in state and local governments. 
 
Id. at 378-79. 
 
For these reasons, the Court rejected "any interpretation 
of the Sherman Act that would allow plaintiffs to look 
behind the actions of state sovereigns to base their claims 
on [charges that the state's decision making process was 
corrupted by bribery or other unlawful activity]." Id. at 379. 
It concluded its discussion of the city's immunity by 
"reiterat[ing] that, with the possible market participant 
exception,4 any action that qualifies as state action is `ipso 
facto . . . exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws.' " 
Id. at 379 (emphasis in original) (quoting Hoover v. Ronwin, 
466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984)). 
 
Turning to the liability of Omni, the Court addressed 
whether Noerr's immunity for private parties was subject to 
any of the exceptions that had been urged in the context of 
Parker immunity.5 It declined to restrict Noerr immunity in 
this way for the same reason it had declined to so restrict 
Parker immunity: 
 
       Insofar as the identification of an immunity-destroying 
       "conspiracy" is concerned, Parker and Noerr generally 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The referenced possible exception relates to state action as a 
purchaser or seller in the market rather than as a sovereign regulator. 
 
5. The Court first concluded that the "sham" exception to Noerr 
immunity was inapplicable because that exception"encompasses 
situations in which persons use the governmental process -- as opposed 
to the outcome of that process -- as an anticompetitive weapon." Id. at 
380. COA had sought to use only the outcome of the process to suppress 
competition. 
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       present two faces of the same coin. . . . The same 
       factors which, as we have described above, make it 
       impracticable or beyond the purpose of the antitrust 
       laws to identify and invalidate lawmaking that has 
       been infected by selfishly motivated agreement with 
       private interests likewise make it impracticable or 
       beyond that scope to identify and invalidate lobbying 
       that has produced selfishly motivated agreement with 
       public officials. "It would be unlikely that any effort to 
       influence legislative action could succeed unless one or 
       more members of the legislative body became . . .`co- 
       conspirators' " in some sense with the private party 
       urging such action. And if the invalidating"conspiracy" 
       is limited to one that involves some element of 
       unlawfulness (beyond mere anticompetitive motivation), 
       the invalidation would have nothing to do with the 
       policies of the antitrust laws. In Noerr itself, where the 
       private party "deliberately deceived the public and 
       public officials" in its successful lobbying campaign, we 
       said that "deception, reprehensible as it is, can be of no 
       consequence so far as the Sherman Act is concerned. " 
       365 U.S. at 145. 
 
Id. at 383-84 (emphasis added). 
 
The teachings of Omni are pertinent here. Considerations 
of federalism require an interpretation of the Sherman Act 
that forecloses liability predicated on anticompetitive 
injuries that are inflicted by states acting as regulators. 
Liability for injuries caused by such state action is 
precluded even where it is alleged that a private party 
urging the action did so by bribery, deceit or other wrongful 
conduct that may have affected the decision making 
process. The remedy for such conduct rests with laws 
addressed to it and not with courts looking behind 
sovereign state action at the behest of antitrust plaintiffs. 
Federalism requires this result both with respect to state 
actors and with respect to private parties who have urged 
the state action. 
 
Here, the Department is authorized by state statute to 
regulate the number, size, and spacing of health care 
facilities. Like the statute in Omni, this statute provides a 
"clear articulation of state policy" which authorizes the 
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Department "to displace unfettered business freedom in a 
manner that regularly has the effect of preventing normal 
acts of competition, particularly on the part of new 
entrants." Id. at 373. While it is true that the challenged 
decision of the Department involved an individualized 
application of established criteria, rather than the 
establishment of criteria as in Omni, the Department's 
action was every bit as essential to the execution of the 
sovereign's regulatory policy as was the adoption of the 
zoning ordinance by the Columbia city council. 
 
The Surgical Center's CON application called upon the 
Department to determine whether the opening of a new 
ASC was in the public interest. The Department conducted 
its own investigation and then held a hearing at which all 
interested parties had the opportunity to tender evidence 
and argument. It then made findings and determined that 
the issuance of the CON was not in the public interest. 
After a second hearing, that determination was concurred 
in by the Board, and the Commonwealth Court thereafter 
concluded that the Board's decision was supported by 
substantial evidence. 
 
It is not clear to us that the issue of whether the 
Hospital's new facility would be completed was considered 
important by the Department or the Board. Neither made 
an express finding on that issue.6 It is clear from the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Board's "need projection formula" projected a need for 6.5 
operating rooms. The Hospital currently had six general purpose 
operating rooms and a room used for "short procedures" such as 
endoscopies, colonoscopies and sigmoidoscopies. If and when the 
Hospital's proposed facility was completed, three of the general purpose 
operating rooms would be closed and the ambulatory surgical services 
provided in the main building would be provided in the new facility. The 
Surgical Center proposed to add two operating rooms under 
circumstances where the State Health Plan's need-project formula 
indicated, at most, need for one additional (seventh) operating room. In 
terms of the population to be served and the surgical services to be 
rendered, the Surgical Center's project would do little other than raise 
the number of operating rooms in Armstrong County above the limit set 
by the State Health Plan. The Board, therefore, concluded that approval 
of the instant CON application would result in needless duplication of 
existing facilities and health care services. While the Surgical Center 
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Board's written decision, however, that the Board heard 
evidence on the issue, knew construction had been halted, 
and believed "there was credible evidence that the project 
ha[d] not been abandoned." Board Op. at 14. Thus, to the 
extent this issue was material, the record reflects that the 
decision makers recognized that there was a dispute and 
made a credibility determination concerning it. 
 
On the facts alleged in the complaint, it is also clear that 
the state decision makers were disinterested, conducted 
their own investigation, and afforded all interested parties 
an opportunity to set the record straight. The initial 
decision was then twice reviewed. Finally, anyone who 
believed that a fraud was committed on the Department or 
Board could have moved to reopen the proceeding and 
attempted to persuade them that they were materially 
misled. See, e.g., 1 Pa. Code SS 35.231, 35.233 (authorizing 
a reopening of an administrative proceeding on motion of a 
participant or by the agency whenever the public interest 
requires). As matters currently stand, however, the 
Department's decision concerning where the public interest 
lies remains in place as the final decision of the Board and 
the judgment of the Commonwealth Court. 
 
In these circumstances, Omni compels us to affirm the 
District Court.7 Indeed, such a result seems to follow, a 
fortiori, from Omni given the conceded presence here of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
projected a higher need and suggested that its facility would serve a 
larger area than the hospital, the Board found its projections flawed. The 
opinion of the Commonwealth Court establishes that it also understood 
this to be the basis for the Board's ruling, a basis for which it found 
support in the record. 
 
7. We acknowledge that the result we reach is in conflict with the holding 
of the court in St. Joseph's Hospital v. Hospital Corp. of America, 795 
F.2d 948 (11th Cir. 1986) and with the analysis of the courts in Kottle 
v. Northwest Kidney Centers, 146 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 1998) and Potters 
Medical Center v. City Hospital Ass'n., 800 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1986). To 
the extent of that conflict, we respectfully disagree with the views there 
expressed. We note that the courts in St. Joseph's Hospital and Potters 
Medical Center did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's 1991 
decision in Omni and that Kottle's brief analysis does not reference that 
decision. 
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disinterested decision makers, an independent 
investigation, an open process, and extensive opportunities 
for error correction. The risk that the plaintiff 's injury is 
not the result of a bona fide execution of state policy is far 
less substantial here than in Omni and there is, 
accordingly, far less justification for federal court review of 
the state's policy judgment. For these reasons, we must 
decline the Surgical Center's invitation to look behind the 
decisions of the Department, the Board, and the 
Commonwealth Court. Rather, based on Omni, we are 
constrained to honor the Hospital defendants' claim to 
Noerr immunity.8 
 
V. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's order 
dismissing the Surgical Center's complaint for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. This is not a case like Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Machinery 
and Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), or Woods Exploration & Prod. Co., 
Inc. v. Aluminum Company of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971). In 
Walker, the state action was the issuance of a patent which allegedly 
had been procured by fraud. The attempted enforcement of the patent 
against the plaintiff was held actionable under the Sherman Act. The 
decision making process there was an ex parte  one in which the Patent 
Office was wholly dependent on the applicant for the facts. While the 
Patent Office can determine the prior act from its own records, it 
effectively and necessarily delegates to the applicant the factual 
determinations underlying the issuance of a patent. Accordingly, when 
the applicant has submitted false factual information, the state action is 
dependent on financially interested decision making. See Einer Elhauge, 
Making Sense of Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80 Calif. L. Rev. 1177, 
1249 (1992) (suggesting that the immunity exception recognized in 
Walker is "very narrow" and applies only when financially interested 
parties essentially made the factual determinations that triggered the 
governmental restraint). The same is true of the situation in Woods 
where the Texas Railroad Commission was wholly dependent on the 
antitrust defendants for the factual information on which it predicated 
its allocation of production from a given field. 
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SCHWARTZ, Senior District Judge, Dissenting: 
 
With its decision today, the majority holds private parties 
who make misrepresentations that pervasively influence the 
decision making process of public entities are entitled to 
immunity under both the state action immunity doctrine 
and the Noerr-Pennington immunity doctrine. The majority 
opinion conflicts with the teaching of this Court in an 
opinion issued less than four months ago, which held that 
under certain circumstances applicable here, material 
misrepresentations that affect the core of a litigant's 
submissions to an administrative body are not entitled to 
Noerr-Pennington immunity. See Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. 
Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
I respectfully dissent for three reasons. First, I believe the 
misrepresentation exception to the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine should be applied when intentional falsehoods 
pervade the entire state administrative proceeding leading 
to the denial of plaintiff 's application for a certificate of 
need ("CON"). Second, the majority's position that the 
misrepresentation exception has no place in the 
jurisprudence of this Circuit is not supported by case law. 
Finally, the majority relies on a Supreme Court decision 
that is not applicable to this case. As a consequence, the 
defendant should not be able to escape liability for its 
misrepresentations under either the state action or Noerr- 
Pennington immunity doctrines. 
 
According to the majority opinion, the defendants are 
immune from antitrust liability for their conduct during the 
course of petitioning the Pennsylvania State Health Facility 
Hearing Board ("Board") to deny plaintiff 's application for a 
CON. The majority opinion finds City of Columbia v. Omni 
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991), supports the 
dismissal of plaintiff's claim. First, the majority finds that 
the District Court properly dismissed the boycott and 
misrepresentation claims under the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine. The majority believes that Omni and Cheminor 
Drugs cast doubt on whether a misrepresentation exception 
to Noerr-Pennington immunity exists under any 
circumstances. Further, even if a misrepresentation 
exception exists, the majority asserts that the alleged 
misrepresentations were irrelevant because the Board 
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denied the CON on grounds independent of the 
misrepresentations. The majority emphasizes that the 
decision makers were disinterested, conducted an 
independent investigation, and the process afforded 
opportunities for error correction. In summary, the majority 
has essentially found the denial of the CON was untainted 
by the alleged misrepresentations or boycott threats. 
 
Second, the majority decision argues it was not the 
boycott or misrepresentation, but rather the denial of the 
CON that was the direct cause of the Surgical Center's 
alleged injuries. The majority concludes denial of the CON 
was state action and the Hospital parties are therefore 
immunized from antitrust liability under state action 
immunity, arguing that "[l]iability for injuries caused by 
such state action is precluded even where it is alleged that 
a private party urging the action did so by . . . wrongful 
conduct that may have affected the decision making 
process." [Majority opinion at page 15]. Given the 
procedural posture of a motion to dismiss, I believe the 
majority's conclusion is not only impermissible fact-finding, 
but also contrary to the Surgical Center's entitlement to all 
favorable inferences and resolution of factual disputes in its 
favor.1 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
I. The Hospital Parties' Actions 
 
Armstrong Surgical Center asserts the Hospital parties 
conspired to subvert the establishment of its facility by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the well- 
pleaded facts as true and resolve them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 
F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1998); Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 
902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). In addition, the court may consider allegations 
contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and 
matters of public record. See City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co., 
147 F.3d 256, 259 (1998); Steinhardt Group, Inc. v. Citicorp, 126 F.3d 
144, 145 (3d Cir. 1997). Accordingly, this dissent, like the majority, 
considers both the Board's decision and the Commonwealth Court 
decision. 
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announcing to the Board, which was reviewing the Surgical 
Center's CON application, their intent to boycott the facility, 
and by submitting false and misleading information to the 
Board regarding the Hospital's ASC. The purpose of the 
boycott and misrepresentations was to eliminate a potential 
new entrant whose competition would adversely affect all 
the defendants. The Hospital has a complete area monopoly 
in providing operating room services. The nineteen 
physicians who sent boycott letters performed nearly 90% 
of all surgery in the relevant geographic area. Thus, the 
Hospital parties' actions targeted two criteria the Board 
considers in reviewing a CON application: (1) the need for 
the facility, and (2) its prospective economic viability. 
 
The nineteen physicians in question sent letters to the 
Board, as it was considering the CON application, stating 
they would not use the plaintiff's ASC, but would only use 
the (fictional) ASC provided by the Hospital. The letters 
stated: 
 
       I do not intend to perform surgery at the proposed 
       Armstrong Surgical Center. I intend to use the services 
       of the Ambulatory Surgery Center at Armstrong County 
       Memorial Hospital. The hospital's Ambulatory Surgical 
       Center provides the highest quality medical care at the 
       most reasonable cost. 
 
The letters go on to suggest that since the Hospital's ASC 
is superior, the proposed ASC is unnecessary: "It duplicates 
services already being provided, and it is not cost effective." 
All nineteen letters submitted to the Board were on the 
Hospital stationery, and contained the same language. 
 
The Pennsylvania Department of Health ("Department") 
disapproved plaintiff 's CON application on November 23, 
1993. The Board affirmed the Department's decision on 
March 13, 1996. The Board relied on two grounds for 
affirming the denial of the CON: (1) the Board found the 
Hospital ASC made Armstrong's ASC duplicative and 
unnecessary, and (2) Armstrong's ASC would not be 
economically viable because 90% of the staff physicians 
would not use it. 
 
The Hospital misrepresented to the Board that its ASC 
was substantially built and would be ready for use in the 
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near future. When the Hospital parties made their 
misrepresentations, they knew the Hospital had ceased 
construction of its outpatient facility months before the 
hearing, and that construction had not resumed. The fact 
that the Department learned that this representation was 
false before it denied the CON does not detract from the 
falsity of the representation. The Department and the Board 
learned construction on the Hospital ASC had been 
interrupted, but they did not know the Hospital had no 
intent to build or operate a Hospital ASC. In fact, the Board 
opinion demonstrates the opposite was true. Although the 
Board knew the Hospital was using the building as a 
storage facility, it was led to believe that the Hospital had 
not abandoned the project. Further, because it was not in 
its economic interest, the Hospital did not plan to resume 
construction if Armstrong's CON application was denied. 
The Board's decision relied on the misrepresentation that 
the Hospital ASC was or would be built and the threat of a 
boycott. 
 
Armstrong's ASC would not be economically viable 
because the nineteen physicians who performed nearly all 
surgeries in the area would not use the new facility if 
completed because they would use the Hospital ASC. The 
Board noted the effect of the boycott letters sent by the 
physicians in explaining its denial of Armstrong's CON 
application: 
 
        [T]he most damaging evidence is that the number of 
       physicians who might have been expected to support 
       the facility decreased significantly after the Applicant 
       had submitted its projections. . . . The nineteen 
       physicians who opposed the project in writing are 
       responsible for approximately 90 percent of all surgery 
       performed at the Hospital and each is on the Hospital's 
       staff. 
 
        In other words, after the application was submitted 
       (and for whatever reason) support for the facility 
       eroded among physicians who either had supported it 
       initially or were being counted upon for their eventual 
       participation. Because the Applicant would therefore 
       have to generate much of its volume from outside the 
       service area or from patients who reside in the service 
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       area but currently "migrate" to other locales for 
       ambulatory surgery, we seriously doubt that the 
       volume projections made for the facility can be 
       achieved. 
 
Board Op. at 47-48 (citations and footnote omitted). 
 
With these facts in mind, I turn to the majority 
conclusion that the Hospital parties have immunity for the 
injuries resulting from their misrepresentations. 
 
II.  Applicability of the Noerr-Pennington  Doctrine 
 
The Hospital parties contend the Noerr-Pennington 
immunity doctrine applies because their announced 
intentions not to perform operations at Armstrong's ASC 
facility and statements regarding the existence of the 
Hospital ASC came in the context of supplying information 
to state agencies. In general, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine 
immunizes concerted efforts to restrain or monopolize trade 
when petitioning the government. Eastern R.R. Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); 
see Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia 
Pictures Indus., Inc. ("PRE"), 508 U.S. 49 (1993). The 
purpose or motive in petitioning government officials is 
irrelevant; the fact that the sole purpose might be to 
destroy a competitor does not undermine the protection 
afforded by the immunity. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139. This is 
true even if "some direct injury" is an "incidental effect" of 
legitimate petitioning activity, regardless of whether the 
petitioner is aware of the infliction of such injury. Id. at 
143-144.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Court in Noerr stated: 
 
       It is inevitable, whenever an attempt is made to influence 
legislation 
       by a campaign of publicity, that an incidental effect of that 
       campaign may be the infliction of some direct injury upon the 
       interests of the party against whom the campaign is directed. And 
       it seems equally inevitable that those conducting the campaign 
       would be aware of, and possibly even pleased by, the prospect of 
       such injury. To hold that the knowing infliction of such injury 
       renders the campaign itself illegal would thus be tantamount to 
       outlawing all such campaigns. 
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If the physicians had simply expressed their opposition to 
the proposed facility without intentionally misleading 
administrative decision makers about their intent to use 
the uncompleted Hospital ASC, the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine would protect their statements. Similarly, if the 
Hospital had not informed the administrative decision 
makers it was going to build and operate a Hospital ASC, 
or if it had informed the decision makers it originally 
intended to build and operate a Hospital ASC but had 
concluded it would no longer do so, Noerr-Pennington 
immunity would be available to them. However, as set forth 
above and in the majority opinion, that is not what 
occurred. 
 
A. Courts Have Distinguished Between 
Misrepresentations Made In The Political 
Context As Opposed to the Administrative or 
Adjudicative Context 
 
The majority's reliance on City of Columbia v. Omni 
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991), for the 
proposition that there is no misrepresentation exception to 
Noerr-Pennington immunity is misplaced. In Omni, one 
defendant sought to persuade the city of Columbia to create 
zoning ordinances, which had a detrimental effect on the 
plaintiff, who was a competitor of that defendant. The 
Supreme Court held that the defendant was not liable for 
antitrust violations for statements made to the city. 499 
U.S. at 382. Omni reaffirmed that deliberate 
misrepresentations in the legislative arena, "reprehensible 
as [they are], can be of no consequence so far as the 
Sherman Act is concerned." Id. at 384. The majority's 
reliance on Omni is not persuasive because here, the 
setting is an adjudicatory arena, not a lobbying or 
legislative one as in Omni. 
 
The majority cites Omni for the proposition that there is 
no misrepresentation exception. PRE, which was decided 
two years after Omni, suggests that the issue of whether 
there is a misrepresentation exception to Noerr-Pennington 
remains an open question. 508 U.S. at 61 n.6. While PRE 
cited California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 
404 U.S. 508, 512-13 (1972), with approval, the Supreme 
Court in PRE declined to decide whether Noerr permits 
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antitrust liability for a litigant's fraud or other 
misrepresentations. 508 U.S. at 61 n.6. 
 
The Supreme Court has stated, not once, but twice, that 
"[m]isrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, are 
not immunized when used in the adjudicatory process." 
California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513. Allied Tube & 
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499-500 
(1988), stated that unethical and deceptive practices in 
"less political arenas," such as administrative or 
adjudicatory settings, could violate antitrust laws. Thus, 
the Supreme Court has broadly hinted Noerr-Pennington 
immunity is not intended to shield petitioning activities that 
do not further, but rather distort, the decision-making 
process in the non-legislative context. 
 
Several Circuit Courts of Appeal also have distinguished 
between the level of immunity afforded to 
misrepresentations made in different forums. In Potters 
Medical Center v. City Hospital Ass'n, 800 F.2d 568, 571 
(6th Cir. 1986), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
hospital's certificate of need application contained 
materially false statements about the plaintiff. The court 
stated that "the knowing and willful submission of false 
facts to a government agency falls within the sham 
exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine." Id. at 580. The 
Fifth Circuit in Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. 
Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1296-98 (5th Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972), held that Noerr 
did not protect, inter alia, the filing of false production 
forecasts with a state regulatory commission. The court 
stated that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine seeks to protect 
attempts to influence policies and held that "the abuse of 
the administrative process here alleged does not justify 
antitrust immunity." Id. at 1298. 
 
Other cases have held the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does 
not immunize misrepresentations made in the 
administrative or adjudicative context. See, e.g., Cheminor 
Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 124 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(holding that material misrepresentations in an adjudicative 
arena are not protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity); 
Whelan v. Abell, 48 F.3d 1247, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(finding that if sham claim involves administrative agencies, 
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then Noerr does not protect "petitions based on known 
falsehoods"); St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc. v. Hospital Corp. of 
Am., 795 F.2d 948, 955, reh'g denied en banc , 801 F.2d 
404 (11th Cir. 1986), see infra; Ottensmeyer v. Chesapeake 
& Potomac Tel. Co., 756 F.2d 986, 994 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(suggesting that knowing submission of false information to 
police -- communications which "do not constitute the type 
of `political activity' protected by the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine" -- would fall within the sham exception); Clipper 
Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 
F.2d 1240, 1261 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that Noerr does not 
immunize false information given to an administrative or 
adjudicatory body), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); 
Israel v. Baxter Labs., Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 278 (D.C. Cir. 
1972) ("No actions [efforts to deceive the Food and Drug 
Administration] which impair the fair and impartial 
functioning of an administrative agency should be able to 
hide behind the cloak of an antitrust exemption."). 
 
The rationale for limiting immunity for private actors' 
efforts to mislead adjudicatory or administrative officials is 
that these entities, as compared to legislative bodies, rely 
on information supplied by the parties to a greater extent 
than legislative bodies. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 499-500. 
The Ninth Circuit in Clipper Exxpress, 690 F.2d at 1261, 
explained: 
 
       There is an emphasis on debate in the political sphere, 
       which could accommodate false statements and reveal 
       their falsity. In the adjudicatory sphere, however, 
       information supplied by the parties is relied on as 
       accurate for decision making and dispute resolving. 
       The supplying of fraudulent information thus threatens 
       the fair and impartial functioning of these agencies and 
       does not deserve immunity from the antitrust laws. 
 
The majority recognizes the decision by the Department 
to deny the CON involved an individualized application of 
established criteria. However, it attempts to reconcile the 
difference between the adjudicative context and legislative 
context by arguing that the Department's decision to deny 
the certificate of need was "essential to the execution of the 
sovereign's regulatory policy" regarding health care 
facilities. [Majority opinion at page 16]. This distinction is 
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unpersuasive. Although the government agency's decision 
on the certificate of need application could be viewed as 
essential to regulating health care facilities, St. Joseph's 
Hospital, 795 F.2d at 955, and Kottle v. Northwest Kidney 
Centers, 146 F.3d. 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 
119 S.Ct. 1031 (1999), both held that misrepresentations in 
this context do not have Noerr immunity. Every adjudicative 
decision could be viewed as essential to a sovereign's 
regulatory policy and thus, the majority would nullify the 
distinction the Supreme Court and other appellate courts 
have made between misrepresentations made in the 
legislative context as opposed to the administrative or 
adjudicative context. 
 
The majority appears to argue that the process employed 
by the Department could uncover misrepresentations 
because the Department conducted its own investigation. 
However, in Cheminor, the governmental bodies -- the 
Department of Commerce ("DOC") and the International 
Trade Commission ("ITC") -- also conducted their own 
investigation, but another panel of this Court still held 
material misrepresentations that affect the core of the 
defendant's petition will preclude Noerr-Pennington 
immunity. 168 F.3d at 121, 124 (stating that the "DOC and 
ITC make final determinations after they have conducted 
their own investigations . . . and after they have heard 
further arguments from the parties involved"); see Clipper 
Exxpress, 690 F.2d at 1261-62 (stating that submitting 
false information in an adjudicatory proceeding can be the 
basis for antitrust liability even if the agency was not 
misled by the information). The majority's view, carried to 
its logical extreme, would allow the more skillful liar to 
avoid antitrust liability so long as the decision maker 
conducts its own investigation. 
 
Moreover, it is not clear the Department conducted an 
independent investigation. Rather, the Department relied 
on the Hospital defendants to give truthful information so 
that it could make a fully informed decision. The majority's 
opinion recognizes the Board was misled because the Board 
"made a credibility determination" "that the project ha[d] 
not been abandoned." [Majority opinion at page 17]. 
However, the majority refuses to acknowledge that the 
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Board opinion demonstrates that the denial of the CON was 
based on the false belief, nurtured by the Hospital 
defendants, that the Hospital would build its ASC. 
 
B. Similar Cases Have Held That Misrepresentations 
Relating to a CON Application Do Not Enjoy Noerr 
Immunity 
 
The facts in St. Joseph's Hospital closely parallel those 
alleged by the plaintiff. The defendant, Memorial Medical 
Center ("MMC"), was the sole provider of cardiac surgery 
services in the relevant market area. 795 F.2d at 952. It 
opposed St. Joseph's CON application, claiming it already 
had the capacity to perform more heart procedures in the 
region than required, thus making its competitor's services 
unnecessary. Id. The Board relied upon this information in 
denying St. Joseph's request for a CON. Id. St. Joseph's 
sued, asserting MMC provided false information to the 
Board. Id. at 953. The court found that the 
misrepresentations were not made in the political arena 
and held that parties furnishing false information to a 
government agency passing on specific certificate 
applications are not entitled to Noerr-Pennington petitioning 
immunity. The court held: 
 
       When a governmental agency such as [the State Health 
       Planning Agency] is passing on specific certificate 
       applications it is acting judicially. Misrepresentations 
       under these circumstances do no not enjoy Noerr  
       immunity. 
 
Id. at 955. Accordingly, the court reversed the district 
court's decision granting the defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Id. at 957. 
 
The Ninth Circuit, like the Eleventh Circuit in St. 
Joseph's Hospital, also held Noerr-Pennington immunity 
does not protect a party's intentional misrepresentations in 
similar circumstances. Kottle v. Northwest Kidney Centers, 
146 F.3d. 1056 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1031 
(1999). As in this case, the district court in Kottle granted 
the defendant's motion to dismiss. Id. at 1058-59. The 
Kottle court also examined allegedly false information 
relating to a CON application. Id. at 1058. The court stated 
that if misrepresentations made by a defendant were of 
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such magnitude that the "entire CON proceeding was 
deprived of its legitimacy," then the sham exception to 
Noerr-Pennington immunity would apply. Id. at 1063. 
 
The misrepresentations in Kottle were made in an 
administrative or adjudicatory arena because the 
Department of Health, the decision maker, conducted 
public hearings, accepted written and oral arguments, 
permitted representation by counsel, issued written 
findings, and its decision was appealable. Id.  at 1062. In 
this case, the Department also conducted public hearings, 
accepted evidence and argument from interested parties, 
made findings, and its decision was appealable. Since the 
court in Kottle found that the misrepresentations were not 
made in the political or lobbying context, the court applied 
a different standard than the one set forth in Omni. Id. 
(stating that "intentional misrepresentation to government 
officials" is treated differently "outside of the political 
realm"). The court found, however, that the plaintiff 's 
complaint fell short of invoking the sham exception because 
the plaintiff 's vague allegations of misrepresentation were 
insufficient to overcome the defendant's Noerr-Pennington 
immunity. Id. at 1064. The court could not ascertain "what 
representations [the defendant] made, or to whom; with 
whom [the defendant] conspired . . . or what other 
testimony the Department may have had that could have 
influenced its decision to deny [plaintiff]'s CON application." 
Id. In contrast, the plaintiff 's complaint in this case details 
the alleged misrepresentations made by the defendants, 
and the Board decision demonstrates that such material 
misrepresentations influenced its decision, as well as that 
of the Commonwealth Court. See infra. 
 
C. The Defendants' Actions Nullify Their Noerr- 
Pennington Immunity 
 
Our recent decision in Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl 
Corp., 168 F.3d 119 (3d Cir. 1999), does not support the 
majority's position. In Cheminor, the defendant Ethyl 
Corporation complained to the ITC and the DOC that 
plaintiff Cheminor was dumping and selling ibuprofen at 
less than fair value. Id. at 120. Cheminor brought antitrust 
claims in which it alleged that Ethyl's statements to the ITC 
were baseless, made in bad faith, contained false 
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statements, and were brought only for anti-competitive 
reasons. Id. The issue decided by this Court was whether 
alleged misrepresentations by Ethyl vitiated its Noerr- 
Pennington immunity. The Court in Cheminor found the 
alleged misrepresentations were neither material, nor 
affected the core of the defendant's petition because the 
misrepresentations relating to the defendant's profitability 
were "only a small proportion of the numerous factors the 
ITC must consider when making a determination of 
material injury." Id. at 126. Therefore, we affirmed the 
decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Ethyl 
because Cheminor did not satisfy the first step of PRE's 
sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Id. at 127. 
 
Cheminor held material misrepresentations that "infect 
the core" of the defendant's claim and the government's 
resulting actions are not entitled to Noerr-Pennington 
immunity under the "objectively baseless" prong of PRE. Id. 
at 123. Cheminor requires evaluation of misrepresentations 
in determining whether a defendant is entitled to Noerr- 
Pennington immunity. The majority relies on the following 
language in Cheminor to assert Cheminor stands for the 
proposition that this Circuit has held the misrepresentation 
exception is not part of its jurisprudence. 
 
       We decline to carve out a new exception to the broad 
       immunity that Noerr-Pennington provides. Rather, we 
       will determine whether [defendant]'s petition was 
       objectively baseless under the Supreme Court's test in 
       PRE, without regard to those facts that [plaintiff] 
       alleges [defendant] misrepresented. 
 
Id. There are three answers to the majority position. First, 
it ignores the immediately succeeding sentence in the 
opinion: 
 
       If the alleged misrepresented facts do not infect the 
       core of Ethyl's claim and the government's resulting 
       actions, then the petition had an objective basis and 
       will receive Noerr-Pennington immunity under the first 
       step of PRE. 
 
Id. I read this language as meaning that prior to 
determining whether the "petition had an objective basis" 
the Court must determine "[i]f the alleged misrepresented 
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facts do . . . infect the core of Ethyl's claim." Id. If they do, 
the misrepresentation exception applies and there can be 
no "objective basis" for the defendant's position. If, on the 
other hand, the misrepresentation exception is not 
applicable, the defendant's petition could well have an 
objective basis. 
 
Second, the majority has not explained why, if the 
Cheminor court held there was no misrepresentation 
exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, it formulated a 
test for the misrepresentation exception and then 
painstakingly applied the test analyzing whether the 
misrepresented facts affected "the core of Ethyl's claim and 
the government's resulting action. . . ." Id. Third, the court 
in Cheminor relied on a district court case, Music Center 
S.N.C. Di Luciano Pisoni & C. v. Prestini Musical Instruments 
Corp., 874 F. Supp. 543, 549 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). The specific 
language cited with approval by Cheminor reads: 
 
       [A] determination [of objective basis] requires 
       consideration, inter alia, of . . . the nature of the 
       particular allegations of the petition or actions before 
       the administrative agency claimed to be fraudulent or 
       improper, and whether these claimed 
       misrepresentations or improper actions would have been 
       significant to the ultimate outcome or continuation of the 
       proceeding. 
 
Cheminor, 169 F.3d at 124 (citing Music Center, 874 F. 
Supp. at 549) (emphasis added). If there were any doubts 
regarding the court's reliance on Music Center and its 
approval of the misrepresentation exception to Noerr- 
Pennington immunity, the Cheminor court set them to rest: 
 
       If the government's action was not dependent upon the 
       misrepresented information, the misrepresented 
       information was not material and did not go to the core 
       of Ethyl's petition. In sum, a material misrepresentation 
       that affects the very core of a litigant's . . . case will 
       preclude Noerr-Pennington immunity, but not every 
       misrepresentation is material to the question of whether 
       a petition such as Ethyl's had an objective basis. 
 
Id. at 124 (second emphasis added and footnote omitted). I 
am simply unable to accept the majority's reading of 
Cheminor. 
 
                                31 
  
Further, the test set forth in Cheminor is applicable here 
because the alleged misrepresentations in Cheminor were 
made in the adjudicative context. Omni is not applicable 
because the alleged misrepresentations in that case were 
made in a legislative context. In a factually similar case, the 
11th Circuit found that "[w]hen a government agency . . . 
is passing on specific certificate [of need] applications it is 
acting judicially." St. Joseph's Hospital, 795 F.2d at 955. 
Misrepresentations made under these circumstances do not 
enjoy Noerr immunity. Id. 
 
There is a final troubling aspect of the majority's opinion. 
Assuming this dissent's position is correct that Cheminor 
recognizes a misrepresentation exception as part of this 
Circuit's jurisprudence and that the majority holds there is 
no misrepresentation exception to the Noerr-Pennington 
immunity doctrine, the majority has done something it 
cannot do. Under Rule 9.1 of the Internal Operating 
Procedures of this Court, "no subsequent panel overrules 
the holding in a published opinion of a previous panel." 
 
       1. The Defendants' Alleged Misrepresentations 
       Were Material And Infected The Core Of The 
       Defendants' Statements To The Department 
 
The legitimacy of the Board's decision is in question 
because it relied upon materially false information and was 
influenced by threats of an illegal boycott. As stated 
previously, at this stage of the litigation, the plaintiff is 
entitled to all favorable inferences and resolution of factual 
disputes in its favor. Therefore, the court must examine 
whether Armstrong Surgical is entitled, at a minimum, to 
an inference that the misrepresentations were not only 
material, but also affected the core of the defendant's 
claims. 
 
The majority concluded the Board would have denied the 
CON application regardless of whether the Hospital ASC 
would be completed. However, the Board's opinion clearly 
shows that it premised the denial of the CON upon the 
Hospital's misrepresentation that it would complete and 
operate a Hospital ASC. In successive Findings of Fact the 
Board found: 
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        25. The Hospital has partially completed 
       construction of a building on its premises that would 
       house a dedicated outpatient surgical facility. 
 
        26. Upon completion of the Hospital's outpatie nt 
       surgical facility, three of its existing operating rooms 
       would be moved into the new building. 
 
        27. The proposed ambulatory surgery center and  the 
       one which has been partially constructed by the 
       Hospital would serve the same population and would 
       provide essentially the same surgical services. 
 
        28. The Applicant's proposed ambulatory surger y 
       center would needlessly duplicate existing facilities and 
       health care services in Armstrong County. 
 
Board Op. at 6 (citations omitted). Taken in context the 
phrase "needlessly duplicate existing facilities," supra, can 
only mean that Armstrong's proposed ASC would duplicate 
the proposed Hospital ASC. In addition, the letters from the 
19 physicians stated that the proposed facility duplicated 
the services already being provided. As previously 
rehearsed, the Hospital parties knew there was no 
commitment or intent to complete a functioning Hospital 
ASC. 
 
Not only the Findings of Fact, but also the Board opinion 
make clear that the Board, relying upon the 
misrepresentations of the Hospital parties, premised its 
denial of the CON and its entire discussion of need- 
projection upon there being no need for two ASCs-- the 
Hospital's ASC and Armstrong's ASC: 
 
       Although outpatient surgery at the Hospital is now 
       performed in the same operating room as inpatient 
       surgery, the Hospital has partially9 completed 
       construction of a building on its premises to house a 
       dedicated outpatient surgery facility. Upon completing 
       construction, the Hospital would move three existing 
       operating rooms into the new building. 
 
        With regard to the population to be served and the 
       surgical services to be offered, there would be little 
       difference between the Applicant's ambulatory surgical 
       center and the one that the Hospital has partially 
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       completed, except that the Applicant's project would 
       raise the number of operating rooms in Armstrong 
       County above the limit set by the SHP. We conclude 
       that approval of the instant CON application would 
       result in needless duplication of existing facilities and 
       health care services. 
 
        We believe that the factors set forth above, in 
       themselves, are sufficient to support a finding that the 
       Applicant has failed to establish need for the proposed 
       facility by the population to be served. . . . 
 
       _________________ 
       9. Apparently, after construction of the building and 
       some of the interior walls had been completed, staff 
       physicians at the Hospital began to question whether a 
       separate outpatient facility was necessary. Although 
       the building is currently being used as a storage 
       facility, there was credible evidence that the project has 
       not been abandoned. 
 
Board Op. at 14 (citations omitted). It is noteworthy that 
the three Commonwealth Court judges, conducting judicial 
review, were of the belief that the Hospital ASC would be 
completed: 
 
        The hospital has partially completed construction of 
       a building on its premises that would house a 
       dedicated outpatient surgical facility. Upon completion 
       of the hospital's outpatient surgical facility, three of its 
       existing operating rooms would be moved into the new 
       building. 
 
        The proposed ambulatory surgery center and the one 
       which has been partially constructed by the hospital 
       would serve the same population and would provide 
       essentially the same surgical services. Armstrong's 
       proposed ambulatory surgery center would needlessly 
       duplicate existing facilities and health care services in 
       Armstrong county. 
 
Commonwealth Court Op. p. 5. At the very least four judges 
-- three Commonwealth judges and this judge -- read the 
Board opinion as indicating that the Department believed 
the Hospital ASC would be completed. 
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The presence or absence of a Hospital ASC was 
significant. A CON is granted if a proposed health care 
expenditure will meet medical needs of the target 
population in an effective and cost efficient manner. See Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 35 S 448.707. There is no question that an 
ASC was more cost efficient than the continued use of the 
six hospital operating rooms. The Hospital's own 
accountant documented projected average cost savings of 
$400 per case if an ASC were used relative to the current 
Hospital operating rooms. 
 
The issue before the Board was whether there would be 
overcapacity of ASCs if a CON were issued to Armstrong. 
Because the misrepresentations led the Board to believe 
there would be a Hospital ASC, it never reached the issue 
of delivering effective and cost efficient medical services 
under the scenario in which there was no Hospital ASC. 
There is simply no way for the District Court or this Court 
to determine whether the Board would have granted the 
CON had it known the true facts. With the Court having to 
accept all well-pleaded facts as true and resolve them in the 
light most favorable to the nonmovant, see Trump Hotels & 
Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 
483 (3d Cir. 1998), the plaintiff is surely entitled to the 
reasonable inference that the Board predicated its decision, 
in major part, on the belief that a Hospital ASC would be 
completed. Therefore, I would hold the alleged 
misrepresentations deprive the Hospital parties of Noerr- 
Pennington immunity because their misrepresentations 
were material and infected the very essence or core of the 
administrative proceeding and consequent denial of the 
CON by the Board and affirmance of the Board's decision 
by the Commonwealth Court. Where as here, the 
misrepresentations caused the Board and Commonwealth 
Court to make their determinations based upon the 
existence of a fictional Hospital ASC, the administrative 
proceeding and Commonwealth Court review have been 
deprived of their legitimacy. 
 
       2. Noerr-Pennington Immunity Does Not Protect 
       Threats of an Illegal Boycott 
 
While an issue of first impression, the question of 
whether Noerr-Pennington petitioning immunity protects 
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threats of an illegal boycott must also be answered in the 
negative. The Supreme Court has stated, "[t]here are many 
other forms of illegal and reprehensible practice which may 
corrupt the administrative or judicial processes and which 
may result in antitrust violations." California Motor Transp., 
404 U.S. at 513. If the Supreme Court would not immunize 
misrepresentations in the judicial or administrative context, 
it surely would not immunize threats of illegal activity when 
they corrupt the administrative adjudication process. 
Where a threat of illegal activity plays such a strong role in 
the administrative decision-making process and forms part 
of the basis for an administrative decision, it is impossible 
to say that the process has not been corrupted. Denying 
Noerr-Pennington immunity to those who provide false 
information to the government in its deliberative decision- 
making process can only improve the information flowing to 
the government. 
 
Attention is now turned to whether the Hospital parties 
are protected by state action immunity as urged by the 
majority. 
 
III. Applicability of State Action Immunity  
 
The majority opinion also dismisses Armstrong's 
complaint on the theory that the Hospital defendants' 
actions are immunized under the Parker state action 
immunity doctrine. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 
(1943). The state action immunity doctrine has two related 
aspects. First, as elaborated in Parker, state action 
immunity protects parties who engage in otherwise 
actionable antitrust conduct, pursuant to, and in reliance 
upon, state action. Second, state action immunity applies 
when the antitrust injury complained of arises directly from 
state action, as distinguished from the private action 
alleged in the complaint before us. Noerr, 356 U.S. at 136. 
In this case, neither aspect of state action immunity is 
applicable.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The staff physicians defendants eschewed reliance upon Parker state 
action immunity, stating in the catch line of their argument, "Plaintiff's 
Attempt to Reframe this Appeal in Terms of State Action Immunity is 
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It is clear the actions complained of were not pursuant 
to, or in reliance upon, state action. Indeed, reliance upon 
the state action of denial of the CON to immunize unlawful 
anti-competitive conduct which occurred prior to and 
caused the denial of the CON presents severe conceptual 
difficulties. The only state action was denial of the CON. 
The Hospital parties engaged in no alleged unlawful anti- 
competitive behavior following the denial of the CON. 
Rather, the misrepresentations combined with the 
expressed intent to engage in a boycott all occurred before 
the Board's denial of the CON. With this state of affairs, it 
is difficult to understand how the misrepresentations 
coupled with the stated intent to boycott are somehow 
immunized by the CON, where the alleged wrongful activity 
itself was directed to and resulted in the denial of the CON. 
Furthermore, even assuming these conceptual difficulties 
are not insurmountable, there is no indication the Hospital 
parties relied upon the denial of the CON in carrying out 
the alleged unlawful anticompetitive behaviors, or were 
authorized by the state to do so. Indeed, the Parker court 
expressly noted that "a state does not give immunity to 
those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to 
violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful." 317 
U.S. at 351. Therefore, the "authorization" aspect of state 
action immunity is not applicable to the facts of this case. 
 
The second aspect of state action immunity doctrine 
"immunizes" antitrust injuries directly caused by state 
action. It is this second aspect upon which the majority 
opinion rests, arguing that liability for injuries caused by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Misguided. . . ." Individual Appellee's Br. at 20. Further, the Hospital 
dropped all reference to state action immunity on appeal. Appellee's 
counsel made a deliberate, reasoned choice not to rely on the theory, 
going so far as to state that "the correctness of the District Court's 
decision . . . is not accurately analyzed under state action immunity." 
Individual Appellee's Br. at 22. Thus, this is not a circumstance where 
a litigant's counsel overlooked a theory. While this Court is not limited 
by positions advanced by the litigants, caution is warranted where 
capable counsel expressly disavow reliance on a defense. The majority 
nonetheless has relied upon a state action defense explicitly and 
impliedly discarded by the defendants. 
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such state action is precluded even where it is alleged that 
a private party urging the action did do by unlawful 
conduct. 
 
The defendants' actions are not protected by state action 
immunity for two reasons. First, at least some of the 
injuries of which Armstrong complains were not the direct 
result of the only state action alleged -- the denial of the 
CON. Second, a misrepresentation exception to state action 
immunity must apply under the circumstances presented 
by this case. 
 
The majority finds the plaintiff failed to allege that its 
injuries were caused by the hospital parties' alleged 
economic boycott and misrepresentations. Rather, the 
majority asserts the alleged injuries were either directly 
related to the denial of the CON, or the consequences 
thereof. Even accepting arguendo that state action 
immunity applies to this case, some of the injuries alleged 
by Armstrong are not the direct result of state action, but 
of the alleged misrepresentations and conspiracy to boycott. 
After reciting throughout its complaint the boycott and 
misrepresentations, the Surgical Center lists the following 
damages: 
 
       (1) Denial of the CON required to establish and op erate 
       [its ambulatory surgery center]. 
 
       (2) Denial of [its] ability to establish and  operate [the 
       proposed facility]. 
 
       (3) Delay in securing the required CON, if ultimat ely 
       granted, for the establishment and operation of the 
       [ambulatory surgery center]. 
 
       (4) Increased costs, legal and otherwise, in pursuing 
       Plaintiff's application for a CON. 
 
       (5) Complete loss of the value of the CON, or a 
       reduction in its value when and if ultimately granted. 
 
       (6) Complete loss of the value of Plaintiff's [facility], or 
       reduction of its value when and if permitted to be 
       operated. 
 
       (7) Complete loss of, or reduction in, the income and 
       cash flow which Plaintiff would have received from 
       operation of the [center]. 
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       (8) Other related losses. 
 
Because of the threatened boycott, damage claims 5, 6 and 
7 would have occurred even if Armstrong had received the 
coveted CON. The boycott of plaintiff's surgical center by 
physicians who perform 90% of surgical procedures in the 
relevant geographic market surely would serve to reduce 
the value of the plaintiff's facility, either by the loss of 
business or the increase in costs associated with attracting 
personnel to the facility. An agreement to exclude the 
plaintiff from the relevant market by an economic boycott 
and misrepresentations to the Board may result in 
antitrust injury. See, e.g., Brader v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 
64 F.3d 869, 877 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding complaint 
adequately alleged antitrust injury where plaintiff alleged 
that defendants unreasonably restricted his ability to 
practice medicine in the relevant market and thus reduced 
competition). Therefore, I cannot agree with the majority's 
conclusion that damage claims 5, 6 and 7 stemmed from 
denial of the CON. 
 
The misrepresentation exception to Noerr-Pennington 
immunity should also apply to state action immunity in the 
adjudicatory or administrative context. Where 
misrepresentations and/or threats of illegal activity subvert 
the entire decision making process, the direct cause of the 
injury is not the state action, but rather the 
misrepresentations or threats which made a decision based 
on accurate information impossible. See Woods Exploration 
& Producing Co., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 
1286, 1295 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 
(1972); see also Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & 
Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176 (1965) (holding that 
procurement of patent by fraud on the United States Patent 
Office is actionable under the Sherman Act, 
notwithstanding intervening state action of granting the 
patent). 
 
In the legislative arena, it is difficult to say that any 
particular action, no matter how inappropriate, results in a 
particular legislation which causes injury. However, in the 
administrative and judicial arenas, where agencies and 
courts write reasoned opinions and make decisions based 
on information supplied by the parties, they must depend 
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on the parties to provide accurate information. 4 As stated 
above, the Supreme Court has noted different standards 
apply to conduct in administrative or adjudicatory 
processes. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 
486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988); California Motor Transp. Co. v. 
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972); see supra, 
Part II.A. The misrepresentations here, at the very least, 
largely influenced and very probably dictated the outcome 
of the administrative process. Under that circumstance, it 
is the misrepresentations, not the state action, which 
caused the alleged injuries and dictated the Board's 
decision to deny the CON.5 
 
Because Parker and Noerr are complementary 
expressions of one principle of antitrust law, a 
misrepresentation exception to Parker immunity is 
necessary to effectuate the misrepresentation exception to 
Noerr-Pennington immunity. Without an exception for those 
misrepresentations which have a pervasive influence on 
administrative and adjudicative decisions, only those 
defendants who most effectively subvert the state's process 
-- the ones whose improper behavior results in favorable 
results for them from the state's administrative and 
adjudicatory processes -- would be immune under state 
action immunity. This would not only be a perverse result, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. It is for this reason that reliance by the majority on Sandy River 
Nursing Care v. Aetna Casualty, 985 F.2d 1138, 1142 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 818 (1993), is misplaced. That case involved a decision 
by a legislature to change the law in the face of a boycott. It is 
impossible 
to say that the boycott dictated the outcome of the legislature's 
decision. 
 
5. The majority's reliance on Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, 
Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, 107 F.3d 1026 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 
S.Ct. 264 (1997), also is misplaced. There, an unaccredited law school 
alleged the American Bar Association engaged in anticompetitive conduct 
because graduates from unaccredited schools could not sit for most state 
bar examinations. This Court concluded the source of the injury was the 
action of each of those states because "every state retains the final 
authority to set all the bar admission rules." Id. at 1035. That case is 
distinguishable from the instant case for two reasons. First, the state 
action in that case was non-adjudicative in nature. Second, and more 
importantly, the plaintiff made no allegation that the ABA knowingly 
made misrepresentations which were central to each state's actions. 
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but would entirely vitiate the misrepresentation exception 
to Noerr-Pennington immunity. 
 
This case is similar to Woods. In Woods, the defendants, 
partial owners of a natural gas field, intentionally gave false 
information about their production forecasts to the Texas 
Railroad Commission. 438 F.2d. at 1295. The Commission 
used that information to determine allowable production. 
Id. The court rejected "the facile conclusion that action by 
any public official automatically confers exemption." Id. at 
1294 (citations omitted). The court held that state action 
immunity was not applicable because the 
misrepresentations dictated the outcome: "defendants' 
conduct here can in no way be said to have become merged 
with the action of the state since the Commission neither 
was the real decision maker nor would have intended its 
order to be based on false facts." Id. at 1295. Thus, the 
injury was not directly caused by state action, but by the 
misrepresentations. Similarly in the instant case, the Board 
relied on the Hospital parties' statements of subjective 
intent in making its decision. 
 
The majority believes that Woods is distinguishable from 
the present case because the Texas Railroad Commission 
"was wholly dependent on the antitrust defendants for the 
factual information on which it predicated its allocation of 
production from a given field." [Majority opinion at 18 n.8]. 
The court in Woods stated that the Railroad Commission 
had "no opportunity for meaningful supervision or 
verification" of the defendants' statements and therefore, 
the Commission "must rely on the truthfulness of the gas 
producers." Id. at 1295. I do not find Woods to be so 
different from this case. Here, the Department and Board 
had no way of ascertaining whether the Hospital truly 
intended to complete its ASC. The Department and the 
Board were reasonable in relying on the defendants' 
statements, which clearly implied that the Hospital ASC 
would be completed and utilized. Further, the court in 
Woods did not require that the government entity be 
"wholly" dependent on the information provided by a 
defendant in order to deny state action immunity. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above I would hold state action 
immunity does not protect the defendants' actions. I also 
conclude there is a misrepresentation exception to Noerr- 
Pennington immunity and that it applies in this case. My 
view that material misrepresentations can vitiate Noerr- 
Pennington immunity is supported by Cheminor, 168 F.3d 
at 124, and the case law of other circuits, specifically the 
Fifth, Woods Exploration & Producing Co., Inc. v. Aluminum 
Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1298 (5th Cir. 1971), Sixth, 
Potters Medical Center v. City Hospital Ass'n, 800 F.2d 568, 
580 (6th Cir. 1986), Ninth, Kottle v. Northwest Kidney 
Centers, 146 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 
119 S.Ct. 1031 (1999), Eleventh, St. Joseph's Hospital v. 
Hospital Corp. of America, 795 F.2d 948, 955 (11th Cir. 
1986), and District of Columbia, Whelan v. Abell , 48 F.3d 
1247, 1254-55 (D.C. Cir. 1995). See also Cheminor, 168 
F.3d at 131 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (citing Whelan and 
Kottle for the proposition that PRE preserves a fraud 
exception to antitrust immunity). 
 
The misrepresentations were material as there is an 
overpowering inference that in denying the CON the Board 
accepted the Hospital parties' misrepresentation that the 
Hospital would complete construction and operate a 
Hospital ASC. These same misrepresentations caused the 
Board and Commonwealth Court to pass upon the question 
of whether there was a need for two ASCs. Specifically, the 
misrepresentations deprived the Board from passing upon 
the CON application based upon the true facts -- six 
hospital rooms vis-a-vis the grant of Armstrong's 
application for a CON, with concomitant cost savings of 
$400 per case, thereby meeting the statutory goal of 
meeting medical needs in an effective and cost efficient 
manner. We do not know, of course, whether the Board 
would have granted or denied the CON application had its 
proceeding not been so pervasively infected by the 
misrepresentations and threat of boycott. 
 
I respectfully and regrettably dissent for all of the reasons 
set forth above. While respecting my colleagues differing 
views, I cannot agree with them. I regret the majority result 
for two reasons. First, the majority opinion, in light of 
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Cheminor, has provided little, if any, guidance to the bar, 
future litigants or the public. Second, to the extent the 
majority result provides guidance, it signals that it is willing 
to immunize clear antitrust violations if they can be 
disguised, however disingenuously, as petitioning activities 
without regard to whether they are legitimate, and without 
distinguishing the arena in which they are made. 
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